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The Baker Plan: A New Initiative
On October 8, at the joint annual meeting of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank in Seoul, Korea, Secretary of the Treasury
James Bakerunveiled a U.S. plan entitled "Program
for Sustained Growth" for dealing with the thorny
debt problem of less developed countries (LDCs).
Current strategy centers on debtor nations'
balance"of-payments adjustments under IMF sur-
veillance. The u.s. plan - now commonly called
the "Baker Plan" - adds macroeconomic and
market-oriented structural adjustment policies to
be implemented with assistance from multilateral
lending agencies and commercial banks. It calls for
new funding of $29 billion over the next three
years. Baker stressed that the plan was not meant
to replace the international strategy currently in
place, but to expand on the short-run successes of
the last three years in keeping the world debt
problem under control.
This Letteranalyzes the problems in the current
LDC situation that have given rise to the plan. It
also discusses the plan's prospects for acceptance
by debtor nations, the adequacy of the new loans,
and the likelihood of securing the additional funds
without government guarantees ora relaxation of
international lending regulations. The conclusion is
cautiously optimistic in all three respects.
Features of the plan
In Baker's words, the plan consists of three "essen-
tial and mutually reinforcing" elements:
1. The adoption by principal debtor nations of
comprehensive macroeconomic and market-
oriented structural adjustment policies to promote
growth, reduce inflation, increase domestic savings
and investment, induce repatriation ofdomestic
flight capital, and attract foreign capital inflow.
2. A 50 percent increase ($9 billion) over the next
three years in World Bank and Inter-American
Development Bank lendings to 15 key debtor
countries in support of the countries' structural
adjustment programs.
3. Increased new lending ($20 billion over the
next three years) by the international banking com-
munity to those key debtorcountries that commit
themselves to policies consistent with the plan.
The structural adjustment policies include
a) market-oriented exchange rate, interest rate,
wage and price policies to promote greater eco-
nomic efficiency and responsiveness to growth
and employment opportunities; b) sound mone~.
tary and fiscal policies for reducing domestic imbal-
ances and inflation; c) greater reliance on the pri-
vate sector to help increase employment, produc-
tion and efficiency; d) supply-side actions to
mobilize domestic savings and facilitate efficient
investment by tax reform, labor market reform, and
financial reform; and e) market-opening measures
to encourage direct foreign investment and capital
inflows, as well as to liberalize trade (e.g., by reduc-
ing export subsidies).
To help debtor nations carry out these fundamen-
tal policy reforms, the IMF is expected to continue
to playa pivotal role in the balance-of-payments .
adjustment and medium-term financing area. The
Baker Plan adds the World Bank to the center stage
to promote long-run market- and growth-oriented
structural reforms. Overall, the plan aims to help
debtor nations growout of their debt problems
through economic reforms that would lay the
groundwork for vigorous outputexpansion. Such
expansion would presumably enable the countries
to service better their external debts and, at the
same time, improve their standards of living.
Wherefore the plan?
In the last three years, the strategy to solve the
world debt problem has aimed to forestall debt
crises. First, the debtor nations have been helped
to adopt adjustment programs for slowing import
growth and expanding exports, and thereby to
reduce their payment imbalances. Second, com-
mercial banks have rolled over loans to debtor
nations and extended new loans to help them
meet interest payments and other pressing needs.
Third, the IMF has played a pivotal role in this
strategy by providing balance-of-payment assis-
tance to debtor nations conditional on their adop-FRBSF
tion of adjustment programs. In addition, IMF cred-
its have also served as a pre-condition for banks
and official creditors to agree to reschedule matur-
ing claims and to extend new loans.
The strategy is essentially short-run in nature. It has
bought time pending a vigorous world economic
recovery and substantial declines in real interest
rates, which are expected to help improve debtor
nations' payment prospects and restore voluntary
private international lending.
Thus far, the strategy has achieved considerable
success in containing numerous potentially dis-
astrous situations. A large element of the success
can be attributed to the very substantial adjust-
ments that have been made by debtor nations to
reduce their payments deficits. During the three
years 1983-85, the combined cumulative current
account deficit of ten major debtor nations fell to
an estimated $10 billion from $110 billion during
the preceding three years, 1980-82.
But despite improvements, the debtor nations
have continued to incur substantial current
account deficits because of the huge interest pay-
ments they have had to make. Data on interest
payments by the ten major debtor nations are not
available. For the non-OPEC LDCs as a whole, total
gross interest payments this year are estimated to
be about $72 billion, of which only $43 billion will
be paid by these nations' combined trade-and-
service surplus ($31 billion) and bilateral official
grants ($12 billion); the rest ($29 billion), i.e., their
combined current account deficit, must be
financed through increased foreign indebtedness.
Thus, total LDC debt has continued to mount. For
the ten major debtor nations, the combined debt-
to-export ratio actually increased from 257 percent
in 1982 to an estimated 308 percent in 1985. This
means that the actual debt burden has increased,
not decreased, over the last three years.
Debtor nations' conditions did improve considera-
bly in 1983-84 when their exports grew vigorously,
especially their exports to the United States. Since
mid-1984, however, the export boom has waned
as u.s. output growth slowed and growth in other
industrial countries failed to pick up the slack.
Although nominal interest rates have declined
sharply since mid-1984, world commodity-export
prices have also fallen such that real interest rates
for the LDC-debtor nations have hardly declined.
Moreover, increasing protectionism in major
industrial countries poses a serious threat to the
debtor nations' ability to service their external
debts through export expansion.
To further aggravate the situation, net capital flows
to the debtor nations appear to have declined
sharply. According to available statistics, net lend-
ing by commercial banks to all developing coun-
tries declined from $21 billion in 1983 to $8 billion
in 1984 and a negative $2 billion in the first quarter
of1985.
The large trade balance improvements in the last
three years have been achieved atgreat sacrifice to
the debtor nations' populations. For the ten major
debtor nations, per capita real output declined by
10 percent from its average in 1980-81 to 1985.
The decline amounted to 17 percent for Argentina,
6 percent for Brazil, 9 percent for Mexico, and 14
percent for Peru. With these figures, which reflect
steep declines in personal income and standard of
living, one can understand better the popular
grumbling and political unrest in these hard-
strapped nations.
The debtor nations' lot can be improved only by
vigorous and stable economic growth which now
appears out of reach because of continued high
inflation, low investment incentives, large capital
flight, and structural rigidity in the countries.
Is the plan feasible?
As Secretary Baker stated, all three elements of the
u.s. plan are essential to its success; failure in any
one would jeopardize the entire plan.
The foremost question then is, to what extent
would debtor nations be willing and able to carry
out the proposed structural reforms. Judging from
the protests over the hardships they have had to
undergo in making balance-of-payment adjust-
ments, it might seem unlikely that many of them
would want to undertake fundamental structural
adjustments that are seemingly at odds with their
economic and social philosophies.
However, the severity of potential resistance
should not be exaggerated. It would be wrong to
attribute - or give credit - to the United States
alone for a market-oriented approach to economic
growth. Modern history is replete with success sto-ri€s for this approach - witness the Newly
Industrialized Countries: Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Singapore. Even socialist countries such
as China, Hungary, and Yugoslavia have increased
their use of a market approach. Brazil and Mexico
have already started on this path.
The second question has to do with the adequacy
of the Baker Plan. Skeptics have called the total of
$29 billion additional funds over the next three
years "too little and too late." They cite the huge
annual interest payments ($71 billion) for non-
OPEC LDCs in 1985 and dismiss the less than
$10 billion a year of new money as "pale in
comparison."
This comparison, however, is inappropriate
because itfails to take into account the progress
debtor nations have already made in generating
large trade surpluses, the availability of other exist-
ing public and private channels of financing, and
the fact that the new funds are aimed at helping
not all the debtor nations but only the "major"
ones. As stated, an estimated combined cumula-
tive current account deficit of the 10 largest debtor
nations in 1983-85 is about $10 billion. It appears,
therefore, that the projected amount of new funds,
if attainable, should be adequate.
Finally, to determine the availability of the funds, it
is useful to separate the public sources of funds
from the private. The plan calls for the World Bank
and the Inter-American Development Bank to
increase theirtotal lending by $9 billion over the
next three years. During the fiscal year that ended
June 30, 1985, the World Bank approved $11 bil-
lion in new loans and disbursed $9 billion. Accord-
ing to a U.S. Treasury estimate, the Bank has an
annual lending capacity of about $14 billion.
Apparently, the existing World Bank resources
have been underutilized, and a substantial expan-
sion of its lending should be feasible.
A more questionable source, however, is the com-
mercial banks. Under the plan, they are expected
to provide $20 billion in new loans over the next
three years. Bankers' reactions have varied.
According to press reports, large international
banks have been cautiously supportive, but
regional and small banks have been cool. Banks
were said to have asked for guarantees against
increased risk exposures and relaxation of loan-loss
reserve requirements as conditions for additional
new lendings. It is understandable that bankers
would try to set conditions for new loans to LDC
debtor nations. However, government guarantees
and other measures for reducing bank lending risks
would render the "moral hazard" problem in inter-
national lending unmanageable; they would
severely weaken restraints on imprudent lending.
The dilemma lies in expecting private enterprises
to help resolve the "public good" problem; it is a
classic "externality" problem.
Nevertheless, the experience of the last three years
has been reassuring. Thus far, in spite of the fall in
net lending, the banking community by and large
has been sensitive to its collective responsibility to
help maintain the stability of the world banking
system. It has rolled over maturing loans and
extended new loans as part of an international
strategy.
Despite its cool initial response to the proposed
plan, there is ground to believe that the banking
community can be won over. Continued dialogue
with bankers will be needed to convince them that
a collective increase in new lendings to LDC debtor
nations would better serve their long-run interests.
The persistent LDC-debt problem has been a drag
on world economic growth and a threat to the
world's financial stability. The Baker Plan could be a
major step towards a long-run solution. The plan,
however, addresses only one part of the problem
- the debtor nations. The other part rests with the
industrial nations: sustained, stable economic
growth and a refraining from trade protectionism
are called for to provide an expanding market for
the debtor nations' exports, and thus to enable
them to service their debts. Both parts of the debt
problem must be addressed in an effective long-
run solution.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










loans, Leases and Investments1 2 196,755 793 11,010 5.9
Loans and Leases1 6 177,901 832 10,722 6.4
Commercial and Industrial 50,640 - 282 - 859 - 1.6
Real estate 65,353 153 3,970 6.4
Loans to Individuals 37,876 109 7,324 23.9
Leases 5,406 0 346 6.8
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,670 23 85 0.7
OtherSecurities2 7,184 - 62 204 2.9
Total Deposits 199,260 953 7,705 4.0
Demand Deposits 47,545 1,261 2,173 4.7
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 32,563 388 3,878 13.5
OtherTransaction Balances4 13,835 - 56 1,532 12.4
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 137,880 - 252 3,999 2.9
MoneyMarketDeposit
Accounts-Total 44,904 - 602 6,324 16.3
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 38,475 - 21 - 2,730 - 6.6
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 23,421 - 1,143 902 4.0
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)jDeficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
7 Annualized percent change